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Manufacture of a Martyr?

While Erick Erickson pretty much defeats himself in citing Jonah Goldberg right off the bat, his October 5th column does illustrate perhaps the beginnings of an interesting fold to the hoopla that McChrystal has been a part of lately.  

There has been much to do about how General McChrystal has been frozen out by the President over Afghanistan policy. Much of it is a sort of generated controversy by folks who have been wildly and willfully ignorant of the chain of command, and how it is used.

While Erickson made a tortuous path to connect dots in his October 5th entry, it does begin to connect other dots. Less about how McChrystal is being frozen out, or how Afghanistan is being sacrificed, but rather beginning to show the purpose to the amazing amount of cognitive dissonance about the chain of command, and why McChrystal may be bucking and talking out of school.

Mind you, McChrystal is hardly new to controversy. His handling of the Pat Tillman friendly fire incident makes him an interesting choice to serve up as a potential martyr. And oddly vulnerable–which in some ways makes him more attractive to some to be the lead dog to turn Afghanistan policy, and paint the President as a vindictive and vengeful on subordinates who buck the system. Especially when folks are willfully ignorant on how the chain of command works, or why his statements have been shocking as of late.

But it represents perhaps a longer game being put into play. By serving up McChrystal as Judas Goat, it distances many from the Bush Administration policy of ignoring Afghanistan and putting the conflict that we should have focused on–and its bungled time table and under resourcing–into a hazier focus. It swings attention away from the Bush Administration and puts the war in context with the Obama Administration. And while McChrystal is critical of how the previous Administration handled things, it makes him more attractive as a martyr to a cause. And it has the fingerprints of AEI confidants who have Ivory Towered their way into foreign policy and wartime efforts with brazen indifference to the human cost, and their own often conflicting interests.

Erickson’s blog entry is less interesting in and of itself–and by citing Goldberg, it pretty much turns itself into a parody–but as a part of an over reaching narrative that is shaping itself with McChrystal at the center, less as a motivating factor, but as a framework to address a larger message. It is going to be of interest to see how the message is filled out over the next few weeks–especially if McChrystal manages to get himself in a position to his resignation forced. Which is not an entirely unlike scenario, considering how he’s been talking out of school.

What is interesting, is the lack of marshaling of retired military personnel who are mum on the chain of command issue that is at the heart of keeping this narrative afloat. This is a back burner that is going to build, and watching the framework being laid down is interesting in the fullest of the Chinese curse sense.

How McChrystal is going to shape up the 2010 race, with Democrats now starting to balk at Afghanistan, and seemingly lining up to fall into place into this narrative, will bear some note. In or out, he is going to play a part, and what is sad, is that it looks as if the Democratic leadership is going to let this narrative settle in without much opposition.

 


48 comments

  1. Hollede

    and what is sad, is that it looks as if the Democratic leadership is going to let this narrative settle in without much opposition.

    As a lifelong Democrat, I have suffered through this trait since I returned to the US in the spring of 1979. However, I have never been more frustrated by their sponginess since this past January.

    You know it’s hard out there for a…faithful Democrat;~J

  2. Generals challenge the civilian leaders all the time. We have this fantasy that military leaders stay out of politics and submit wholly to civilian commanders, but that is a myth. There was tension between Washington and the Continental Congress, between Civil War generals and Lincoln, between MacArthur and Truman, between Shinseki and Bush. The list is long and yet when it happens again everyone is all, “Oh, we don’t do that in this country.” Bullshit.

  3. HappyinVT

    so sure.  Only an idiot Democrat would have thought it a good idea to follow Bush and try to clean up his messes.  Afghanistan is likely the worst mess of them all.

    From what I understand the switch to McChrystal made sense because his background is better suited to the type of warfare needed in Afghanistan.  It seems that this would also necessitate a smaller increase in troops that McKiernan would have needed.  Apparently, according to McChrystal, that is not the case.

    I tried to get through the article at RedState but my automatic shudder reflex kicks in pretty soon after I get there.  A problem is that Democrats are automatically seen as being soft on national security and are, therefore, handicapped from the beginning of the discussion.  If Obama determines that additional troops are not needed because of his overarching strategy then he’ll be seen as giving up on the war.  Then you’ve got folks on the Left who are fighting for an increase in troops so Obama (yet again) would be fighting his own party.  Thankfully, public opinion, FWIW, is strongly against the war.

    I’m not sure what McChrystal’s motivation for leaking the report may be.  Where is Petraeus in all of this?  It’s been said he’s looking at 2012 although he is not a registered Republican and has said he’s not interested in running (not that we haven’t heard that before).  I’m not sure a retired general, after umpteen years of two wars folks are sick of, would be embraced by anyone except the warmongers.  Unless there’s another non-homegrown terrorist attack.

    Finally, perhaps someone needs to detail exactly what we’ve gained in Afghanistan.  The government is either corrupt and/or illegitimate.  Opium is still a huge cash cow.  We still don’t know where bin Laden is and I bet most people don’t care anymore.  Meanwhile, hundreds of soldiers and civilians have been killed or wounded.  And, how will we know when we can declare victory?  I’m about ready to say, “bring ’em home.”

  4. creamer

      How about a war tax. I have strong reservations about nation building in Afghanistan. But if we/our elected government decide its nessasary then lets all share the pain. This is not a major issue to a lot of Americans because it doesn’t touch them like Viet-Nam or Korea did. Nobody is being drafted, its not costing the majority of Americans anything they can touch.

     Generals look at war as a growth opportunity, its the quickest way to get their stripes. I find McChrystal speech in London baffling. James Jones has critizised him about not following the chain. Chris Matthews just mentioned Petraeus as a GOP prsidential candidate in 2012. If I where a grunt I don’t know that I like my commander playing politics with my hide.

     Why don’t we just pay the Taliban a couple billion a year not to allow AL-Queda back in.

  5. NavyBlueWife

    I have been reading them for quite some time, and Jon Soltz wrote an article about the questions we should be asking about Afghanistan here.

  6. …though as a Brit, it took me a little time to decrypt the cultural resonances of ‘political generals’. I suppose it goes back to your first President, and then the constant tension between military leaders who serve the CinC, and their own political ambitions.

    Not since Cromwell, nor the disastrous premiership of Wellington, have he had a senior member of the military become Prime Minister. No military man occupies the level of prestige of say Colin Powell, and none of them seem to show political ambitions like Powell or Petraeus.

    So this is a fascinating discussion which didn’t take place in London, despite MaChrystal talking at the IISS. The whole focus instead was on the best route to stabilisation of Afghanistan/Pakistan.

    On that, while I’m becoming a minority, I do think that the strategic stakes are much higher here than in Iraq. Gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear capability has become the focus of all Al Qaeda’s strategy. Also, though the losses are horrendous and tragic for each American (and British/Canadian/French) family involved, they are nothing like the scale of Vietnam. At stake there, beyond the domino theory, was US prestige. At stake here is the prestige of Nato, and pacifying a country where the first big attack on American soil since Pearl Harbour was organised.

    ‘Getting out’ of Afghanistan for a generation is no more an option as ‘getting out’ of Europe post war. However, the strategy and tactics have to be constantly redefined and fine tuned. What should not dictate the policy is ether sabre rattling from the right, or shroud waving from the left.  

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